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Introduction 	  
The end of the Second World War saw the emergence of a bipolar world led by 
two superpowers with contrasting ideologies. The United States represented the West, 
championing democracy and capitalism, while the Soviet Union represented the East, 
championing a totalitarian regime and communism. Tensions peaked with the onset of 
the Cold War in the 1950s, a period defined by a climate of intense fear and mistrust. The 
fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991 signified the end of communism in Russia and 
left Russia in a weaker position on the international stage. Although Russia became 
weaker after the dissolition of the Union of Soviet Republics (USSR), it reamins 
imperative that the United States and Russia cooperate on international affairs, especially 
the global terrorist threat. Cycles of cooperation and conflict define the relationship 
between the United States and Russia. Differing ideologies, a history of mistrust, and 
conflicting interests complicate their ability to cooperate. However, issues such as 
counterterrorism, climate change, and nonproliferation keep bringing both countries back 
to the bargaining table. 
In this thesis I seek to identify which conditions are favorable to U.S.-Russian 
counterterrorism cooperation. Understaing how often and under which circumstances the 
United States and Russia choose to cooperate is necessary to better counterterroirsm 
policy. In November 2015 alone, terrorists killed 140 people in Paris, 44 people in Beirut, 
and 22 people in Mali (Karimi and Burnett 2015; McKirdy et al. 2015; McLaughlin and 
Shoichet 2015). The attacks in Paris, Beiruit, and Mali signify the growing threat of 
global jihadi terrorism. Terrorism has been around for over 1,000 years, but modern 
terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), show unprecendented 
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capabilities in recruting and acquiring financing and territory. Through the internet and 
other sources of communciation, terrorist groups are able to develop global networks and 
establish cells around the world.  
For the United States, terrorism rose to the forefront of its foreign-policy agenda 
following the attacks on September 11, 2001 (Kay 2012). Developing counterterrorism 
strategies became a priority for U.S. policymakers, government leaders, and military 
officials. Part of this strategy is establishing an international coalition against terrorism. 
Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the United States realized it would not be able to stem the 
flow of foreign fighters into the United States or interupt terrorist financial networks 
alone (Kay 2012). The United States realized an international terrorist threat requires 
international counterterrorism action and cooperation (Clutterbuck 2006). As a result, the 
United States seeks multilateral and bilateral relationships to combat terrorism (Bolt et al. 
2008). For example, one such relationship is with Russia.  
Russia is a valuable partner to the United States because of its nuclear arsenal, 
energy resources, seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and geographical 
location (Stent 2014). In turn, Russia seeks partnership with the United States in 
exchange for support in restoring Russia’s dominant role in global affairs (Stent 2014). 
Additionally, the United States and Russia share interests in nonproliferation, stabilizing 
central Asia, climate change, and counterterrorism (Stent 2014). The shared interest in 
counterterrorism stems from the threat radical Islam poses to both Russia and the United 
States.  
In the 1990s, terrorist activity began in the North Caucasus region of Russia. In 
September 2004, a schol siege in Beslan resulted in the deaths of 384 people (Katsy, 
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Sacko, and Khudoley 2008). The Beslan school siege has the same culutural resonance in 
Russia as the 9/11 attacks in the United States (Katsy, Sacko, and Khudoley 2008). 
Russia views radical Islam as influencing and supplying the terrorist activity in the North 
Caucasus (Katsy, Sacko, and Khudoley 2008). Russia’s struggle to contain and eradicate 
terrorism within its borders  represents a shared interest and great oppurtunity for 
cooperation with the United States (Katsy, Sacko, and Khudoley 2008). Despite sharing 
the desire to combat terrorism, cooperation is not guaranteed between the United States 
and Russia due to cultural, social, and foreign-policy differences, as well as a history of 
mistrust. 
Counterterrorism is a shared interest and both countries demonstrate the 
willingness to cooperate on the issue. However, counterterrorism is not the only issue 
each country pursues. Conflicting foreign-policy interests, such as expansion of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Europe’s missle defense system, often prompt a 
cycle of conflict. Nonetheless, during a cycle of conflict, a country may continue to 
cooperate on certain interests. In this thesis, I seek to discern how a cycle of conflict 
affects counterterrorism cooperation. If a cycle of confict does not affect counterterrorism 
cooperation, I will observe if a terrorist attack is the cause of the counterterrorism 
cooperation. In this thesis, I will seek to address the question, “Do levels of 
counterterrrorism cooperation change depending on the general status of U.S.-Russian 
relations, or are they unaffected by the cycles of conflict and cooperation?” Through the 
examination of general U.S.-Russian relations, terrorist attacks, and past instances of 
counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Russia, I seek to identify 
how sustainable counterterrorism cooperation is. A comprehensive examination of U.S.-
	   6	  
Russian counterrerorism cooperation will lead to a better understanding of U.S.-Russian 
relations and in turn a better-informed counterrorism policy.  
This thesis includes a brief history of U.S.-Russian relations and a discussion on 
the importance of a U.S.-Russian partnership against terrorism. Additionally, this thesis 
evaluates the current literature that discusses reasons for U.S.-Russian counterterrorism 
cooperation failures and notes the gaps in the literature. This thesis also includes an 
analysis of general U.S.-Russian relations from 2009 through 2014. Additionally, I make 
a record of terrorist attacks and instances of counterterrorism cooperation from 2009 
through 2014, and I then examine how the broader status of U.S.-Russian relations or the 
occurrence of a terrorist attack affects the freqeuncy of counterterrorism cooperation.  
Historical Background 
A Brief History of U.S.-Russian Relations since World War II 	  
 U.S.-Russian relations are defined by periods of conflict and cooperation. World 
War II witnessed a great partnership between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
which succeeded in defeating Nazi Germany (Office of the Historian, 2005). However, 
tensions, resulting from ideological differences, strained the partnership. The 1939 Nazi-
Soviet Pact, the Soviet attack on Finland, and the Soviet invasion of the Baltic States of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940, strained relations (Office of the Historian, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the partnership persisted out of necessity. Ideological differences were 
subordinated, albeit temporarily, to the common goal of defeating fascism (Office of the 
Historian, 2005). The countries came to a shared realization that they needed each other 
to defeat what they perceived to be the most pressing threat.   
	   7	  
 Following World War II, the United States and Russia entered the Cold War. A 
global superpower standoff, an arms race, and proxy wars, brought the world to the brink 
of destruction. The world was divided between the democratic United States and the 
communist ideals represented by Soviet Union. The Cold War witnessed great tension 
and mistrust between the West and the East. Eventually, the Soviet Union collapsed in 
December 1991, leading to the end of the Cold War (Stent 2014). Following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, a question arose: Would Russia choose to become part of the West 
or continue maintaining a separate economic and ideological identity (Bolt et al. 2008)? 
Russia ultimately chose to maintain its separate identity and Cold War tensions 
continued, complicating future cooperation (Bolt et al. 2008).  
Many factors account for the strained relations and obstacles to cooperation in 
U.S.-Russian relations that followed the Cold War. For example, following the Cold War, 
both countries viewed the other in ways that fostered resentment and hindered 
cooperation. The United States started to sideline Russia in international affairs and this 
angered Russia (Snetkov 2015). Following the end of the Cold War, Russia claimed that 
the United States treated it as a defeated rival, not a potential partner (Stent 2014). Many 
Russians equated respect with fear and were angered when they believed the United 
States no longer regarded Russia as an equal (Stent 2014). From the U.S. perspective, the 
U.S. Congress was wary of engagement with Russia because its members viewed Russia 
as economically backward and noted the chaos following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Herd, Azizian, and Yixuan 2008). The United States also criticized Russia for 
human rights abuses in the Northern Caucasus (Herd, Azizian, and Yixuan 2008). In turn, 
U.S. criticism further angered Russia.  
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Post-Cold War resentment and frustrations were exacerbated further when the two 
countries’ foreign-policy agendas started to conflict in the 1990s. Along with President 
Vladimir Putin’s ascendency in 1999 came the rise of a “Russia first” philosophy 
(Snetkov 2015). Putin made it clear that any Russian national interest would come before 
any agreement with the West (Bolt et al. 2014). Putin emphasized the need for Russia to 
return to its “great power status” and reclaim its spot on the international stage (Snetkov 
2015). Additionally, Russia emphasized the importance of state sovereignty and 
demonstrated its willingness to come to the defense of countries whose state 
sovereignties were being threatened. This often led to clashes with the United States and 
organizations like NATO, which focused on promoting democracy abroad.  
The U.S.-Russian relationship in the aftermath of the Cold War was shaped by 
their history of mistrust, and their differing ideologies, especially their conflicting views 
regarding democracy promotion. Despite continued tensions; however, the United States 
and Russia share common interests and note payoffs from occasional cooperation. For 
example, Russia views cooperation with the United States as optimal because Russia 
believes integration with the West will help to build and modernize its economy (Kay 
2012). Similarly, the United States views Russia as a beneficial partner in managing the 
rise of China and controlling nuclear proliferation (Kay 2012). Furthermore, both 
countries note the importance of a partnership against terrorism. Aligning interests thus 
lead to occasional cooperation between the United States and Russia. 
Literature Review 	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 The United States and Russia share common interests that warrant cooperation; 
however, they also pursue diverging foreign-policy interests. Cycles of conflict and 
cooperation define the U.S.-Russian relationship. Often times, the United States and 
Russia pursue conflicting and shared interests simultaneously. In order to better 
cooperation between the United States and Russia, it is necessary to understand the 
conditions favorable to cooperation. When the United States and Russia simultaneously 
pursue diverging and converging policies, it is difficult to predict whether the countries 
will choose cooperation or isolation. There is literature on general cooperation theories 
and on U.S.-Russian cooperation that could aid in creating a framework to predict when 
the United States and Russia will choose to cooperate, and specifically when they will 
cooperate on counterterrorism.  
 In order to identify whether levels of counterterrorism cooperation change 
depending on the general status of U.S.-Russian relations, I first look at general 
international relations (IR) theories in order to determine if they offer a suitable 
framework to predict when the United States and Russia will cooperate. I then review 
literature concerning U.S.-Russian cooperation in general and then U.S.-Russian 
counterterrorism cooperation specifically. In regards to literature specific to U.S.-Russian 
cooperation, I look at four attempts at bettering cooperation between the United States 
and Russia. Additionally, in regards to literature specific to U.S.-Russian cooperation, I 
review literature that discusses the attractiveness of a partnership against terrorism to the 
United States and Russia. Lastly, I look at literature discussing factors that may hinder 
U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation. I take note of information in the literature 
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that aids in creating framework to predict U.S.-Russian behavior concerning 
counterterrorism. I also observe any gaps in the literature in creating the framework.  
Literature on International Cooperation 	  
IR theorists formulate theories in order to predict states’ behaviors. IR theorists 
attempt to predict when states will choose to cooperate by analyzing relative and absolute 
gains. Realism and liberal institutionalism are two IR theories that discuss international 
cooperation in terms of absolute and relative gains. However, liberal institutionalism and 
realism maintain conflicting views on whether relative or absolute gains motivate 
cooperation and as a result disagree on the cause and sustainability of international 
cooperation. 
 Realism views states as rational actors in an international system characterized by 
anarchy (Rousseau 2002). An anarchical system results in an emphasis on survival and 
the best way to ensure survival is to accumulate power. Consequently, states, as rational 
actors, evaluate choices in order to maximize power. As a result, states occasionally enter 
into mutually beneficial alliances to pursue self-interests and maximize power (Hastedt, 
Lybecker, and Shannon 2015). However, because the international system is anarchic, 
realists argue that cooperation is rare (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948). Not only is 
cooperation rare, but also it is unsustainable because states’ desire for power makes 
conflict inevitable. Any gain in power by one state represents an inherent threat to other 
states (Rousseau 2002). Therefore, realists state that any potential exchange between 
states must preserve the preexisting balance of power and if not, states will choose 
isolation rather than cooperation (Rousseau 2002). Relative gains refer to the power 
gained by others during an exchange. According to realism, states are concerned with 
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relative gains and concerns over relative gains will determine whether states choose 
cooperation or isolation. 
Realists focus on relative gains; however, proponents of liberal institutionalism 
focus on absolute gains. Liberal institutional theorists, similar to realists, view states as 
rational actors pursuing self-interests (Hastedt, Lybecker, and Shannon 2015). However, 
unlike realism, liberal institutionalism argues that the interconnectedness of states, which 
results from globalization, international trade, and international institutions, promotes 
cooperation (Hastedt, Lybecker, and Shannon 2015). Liberal institutional theorists do not 
view cooperation as rare or unsustainable. Instead, they argue that states have the ability 
to cooperate when it is shown that cooperation is a more effective means of achieving 
goals than conflict (Hastedt, Lybecker, and Shannon 2015). Increased communication 
and interconnectedness allows states to communicate and establish tactical and strategic 
agreements that result in payoffs for both countries. Absolute gains refer to the personal 
gains made by an individual country (Rousseau 2002). Liberal institutional theorists 
argue that states are concerned with the absolute gains of cooperation and will accept any 
agreement that makes the states better off (Rousseau 2002). States will not choose 
isolation solely because they view the balance of power changing, but will rather focus 
on their individual payoffs.  
Various international scholars argue that states do not pursue a strategy in terms 
of pure absolute gains or pure relative gains, but instead countries pursue mixed 
strategies. Whether states choose to cooperate or not varies depending on beliefs of 
individual leaders, the nature of the opponent, and the context of the situation (Rousseau 
2002). For example, the nature of the opponent can influence the choice to cooperate 
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because states perceived as economic or military threats may be more likely to trigger 
concerns about relative gains than nonthreatening states (Rousseau 2002). Furthermore, 
states are more concerned with relative gains on matters concerning security issues, such 
as nuclear arms-reduction treaties, conventional arms accords, and territorial exchanges, 
than on non-security issues (Rousseau 2002). A mixed strategies view holds that two 
states with common interests will focus on both absolute and relative gains depending on 
their relationship and the policy issue under consideration.  
Shortcomings of International Cooperation Theory 	  
The literature on general cooperation does not account for complex relationships 
such as the U.S.-Russian relationship. There are times when the United States and Russia 
pursue relative gains, especially when concerning expansion of NATO and the European 
Union (EU). There are also examples of when the United States and Russia focus on 
absolute gains such as counterterrorism cooperation and climate change. However, the 
mixed strategies theory fails to discuss when issues that warrant relative gains 
considerations and issues that warrant absolute gains are being pursued simultaneously. 
For example, the literature does not offer a framework for decision-making if Russia is 
focused on the balance of power shift resulting from NATO expansion, but also values 
U.S. cooperation on issues such as counterterrorism cooperation where it is more 
concerned with absolute gains. The United States and Russia are rivals; however, they 
also note benefits of potential partnership.  
Arguments for pure-absolute gains, pure-relative gains, or mixed strategies do not 
adequately account for rival states pursing multiple foreign policies at once. Two states 
can pursue conflicting policies in one area and converging policies in another area. A 
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purely realist view does not account for the pursuit of absolute gains on issues such as 
counterterrorism cooperation. Likewise, a purely liberal intuitionalist view does not 
account for cooperation failures between the United States and Russia. A mixed 
strategies view does offer a more complete framework; however, it fails to account for 
rival countries that pursue multiple foreign policies simultaneously and does not offer a 
sufficient framework to predict U.S. and Russian behavior.  
Literature on U.S.-Russian Cooperation 
 The Four Resets  	  
In the post-Cold War period, shared interests resulted in four resets in U.S.-
Russian relations, aimed at bettering cooperation. 1 The first reset occurred during the last 
year of former president George H.W. Bush’s presidency. Bush developed a good 
working relationship with Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev (Stent 2014). Bush treated 
Russia’s transition following the collapse of the Soviet Union with respect and did not 
exacerbate Russian uncertainties (Stent 2014). Bush did not attempt to overhaul the U.S.-
Russian relationship, but he did seek to engage with Russia on matters regarding nuclear 
weapons (Stent 2014). Bush and Gorbachev were successful in redefining relations with 
the Soviet Union in the post-Cold War environment on issues concerning nuclear 
weapons (Knott). For example, in July 1991, Bush and Gorbachev signed the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) (Knott). Despite gains in cooperation, Bush’s reset 
began to slow when Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union on December 
25, 1991 and President Boris Yeltsin took office. Additionally, the Russian economy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Obama first used the term “reset” to describe U.S.-Russian relations in a speech in 
2009. Angela E. Stent in The Limits of Partnership (2014) uses Obama’s “reset” 
terminology to describe four attempts at revamping the U.S.-Russian relationship since 
the Cold War.  
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started to decline, which also slowed the reset (Knott). Many critics argued Bush did not 
do enough in terms of economic assistance to Russia (Stent 2014). Despite its end, the 
first reset demonstrated the possibility of U.S.-Russian security cooperation in the post-
Cold War period.  
Former president Bill Clinton attempted a more aggressive approach at bettering 
the U.S.-Russian partnership than Bush had. Russia reaped benefits from Clinton’s 
attempts to foster the growth of Russian democracy, enhance nuclear nonproliferation, 
support the sovereignty of post-Soviet states, and aid Russian economic development 
(Stent 2014). Clinton’s attempts witnessed some success as U.S.-Russian cooperation 
resulted in denuclearizing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Nuclear cooperation was 
limited; however, as the Russian Duma did not ratify START II (Stent 2014). 
Additionally, it became clear that America’s version of capitalism and democracy was 
not going to take hold in Russia (Stent 2014). Furthermore, the U.S. and Russia 
continuously disagreed over post-Soviet territory and NATO expansion. Lastly, Russia’s 
support for Iran’s nuclear program complicated the reset (Stent 2014). Despite Clinton’s 
efforts, his hopes for the U.S.-Russian partnership were not met during his two terms in 
office (Stent 2014). It was evident that the relationship “was at best, a selective 
partnership, where cooperation and competition coexisted, albeit in fluctuating 
proportions” (Stent 2014, 15). The United States and Russia may have desired 
cooperation, but conflicting interests ultimately limited the partnership’s potential during 
the Clinton administration.  
Putin initiated the third reset following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Putin was the 
first foreign leader to reach out to former president George W. Bush following the attacks 
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to offer condolences and assistance (Weitz 2005). The Russian government supported 
U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban in Afghanistan (Weitz 2005). 
Russia had been struggling with a terrorist threat along its border and saw a partnership 
with the United States as beneficial to combating terrorism. Russia also noted benefits 
from the reset because Russia seeks international support to modernize and raise its status 
relative to the West (Kay 2012). Putin believed cooperation with the United States would 
enhance Russian economic integration with the West (Stent 2012). However, shortly after 
the 9/11 attacks, the partnership began to unravel due to rising oil prices, which meant 
that Russia no longer needed to rely on the West for economic support (Stent 2014). By 
2002, the reset was over (Stent 2014). The United States and Russia maintained 
conflicting views on policies regarding Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Russia took issue with 
the U.S. intention to use military force to initiate regime change, especially without UN 
approval. Moscow’s emphasis on sovereignty and nonintervention contrasted with U.S. 
foreign policy, leading to tense relations.  
The fourth and final reset occurred during President Barack Obama’s first term. 
Following the 2008 Georgian conflict, Obama made U.S.-Russian relations a foreign-
policy priority (Stent 2014). The United States did not pursue democracy promotion and 
NATO enlargement as fervently as it had previously because it required Russian 
cooperation on nuclear proliferation, Afghanistan, and Iran (Stent 2014). The United 
States and Russia successfully signed a new START treaty and cooperated frequently on 
issues relevant to Afghanistan. Cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program proved more 
difficult (Stent 2014). As the rest continued, tensions grew. Historically rooted attitudes, 
which “ranged from ambivalent to antagonistic,” constrained any improvement in U.S.-
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Russian relations (Stent 2014, 254). Eventually, the reset ended as tensions surrounding 
Edward Snowden, Syria, missile defense, and NATO enlargement highlighted the 
conflicting interests between the United States and Russia.  
Tensions following the end of the Obama’s reset peaked with the Ukraine crisis. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has demonstrated its strong concerns regarding 
post-Soviet territory. Russia views losing influence over the previously controlled Soviet 
territory as detrimental to its international position (Larrabee, Wilson, and Gordon 2015). 
For Russia, Ukraine constitutes an important strategic area with the capability of 
determining Russia’s geostrategic status (Larrabee, Wilson, and Gordon 2015). Control 
over Ukraine makes Russia an imperial state spanning both Europe and Asia; however, 
without Ukraine, Russia is no longer a Eurasian empire (Larrabee, Wilson, and Gordon 
2015). Russia also finds value in Ukraine because a strong Russian influence in Ukraine 
prevents the spread of Western ideals (Larrabee, Wilson, and Gordon 2015).  
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who shared close ties with Russia, 
followed Russia’s urging when he refused to sign a trade deal with the EU in November 
2013 (McMahon 2014). As a result, protestors demanding closer ties with Europe 
stormed Kiev. Eventually, Yanukovych was ousted in February 2014 and replaced with 
pro-Western businessman Petro Poroshenko (McMahon 2014). Fighting erupted between 
pro-Russian separatists and those seeking closer alignment with the West. Putin entered 
the conflict, claiming to do so in order to protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine (McMahon 
2014). Kremlin-backed forces moved to seize control of the Crimean peninsula, which 
has a Russian-speaking majority. Crimea then voted in a referendum to join Russia 
(McMahon 2014). The United States and the EU deemed Russia’s actions as illegal and 
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in violation of international law (McMahon 2014). The annexation of Crimea and the 
violence in Ukraine highlight the divide between Western and Russian interests. The 
Ukraine crisis and disagreements between Russia and the West have yet to be resolved, 
as Ukraine remains a frozen conflict.  
 The Ukraine crisis emphasized the end of Obama’s reset and the return to a period 
of strained relations due to diverging foreign-policy interests. The four resets highlight 
the shared and conflicting interests between the United States and Russia; however, they 
also demonstrate the willingness of both nations to work together in pursuit of their 
common interests. The end of each reset demonstrates the complicated nature of U.S.-
Russian relations. The literature on U.S.-Russian relations reveals that the relationship is 
defined by periods of conflict and periods where these two rival countries attempt to 
navigate cooperation.  
The Need for a U.S.-Russian Partnership against Terrorism  	  
 Calculated and publicized modern terrorism emerged roughly 125 years ago and 
went international over 40 years ago (Rapoport 2004). The view of international 
terrorism changed as the 9/11 attacks revealed a terrorist threat that was unprecedented in 
its scope and severity and encompassed a global network with great planning and 
logistical capabilities (Rees 2006). The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that the threat of 
radical Islamic terrorism comes from not just one individual, Osama Bin Laden, and not 
just from one organization, Al Qaeda: rather, the threat is from a vast international 
network with a global reach (Ganor 2005). A global threat requires international 
counterterrorism cooperation and action (Clutterbuck 2006). Literature on 
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counterterrorism discusses at great length the need for international cooperation to 
combat terrorism, and that this international cooperation should include Russia.  
The United States is not able to fight terrorism alone, because although it 
“possesses unprecedented power by every traditional measure, it cannot even begin to 
meet the most pressing security challenges facing humanity without reliable partnerships” 
(Bolt and Cross 2008, 1). The United States spends more on its military than China, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, United Kingdom, India, and Germany combined (Peter G. 
Peterson Foundation 2015). Despite its annual military budget of around $600 billion, the 
United States has not been able to prevent terrorist attacks on its soil or the spread of 
terrorism abroad (Peter G. Peterson Foundation 2015). There came a realization that a 
reliance on trying to stop the bombers when they were already in the country was too 
little too late (Clutterbuck 2006). Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States, as well as 
the broader international community, realized that in order “to arrange criminal 
prosecutions across several jurisdictions, to extradite individuals suspected of terrorist 
offenses, and to prevent money from reaching terrorist organizations, there needed to be 
established relationships, built on trust, within the wider international community” (Rees 
2006).  
 Russia is an integral member of the international community that needs to be a 
partner in counterterrorism efforts. The United States and Russia possess the world’s 
largest nuclear arsenals, they are involved in the world’s principal regional conflicts, and 
they play leading roles in opposing international terrorism, and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (Weitz 2005, 1). Despite the benefits of a U.S.-Russian 
security partnership, cooperation has been a constant challenge (Stent 2014). In addition 
	   19	  
to a history of mistrust and a misalignment on certain key policy issues, cooperation 
specifically on counterterrorism matters has proved difficult due to the differing natures 
of the terrorist threats faced by the United States and Russia.  
Differing Natures of U.S. and Russian Terrorist Threats  	  
Literature on U.S.-Russian relations in relation to security issues focuses 
extensively on non-proliferation, and much less on counterterrorism. The literature that 
does concentrate on U.S.-Russian counterterrorism negotiations focuses on the need for a 
partnership and attributes the difficulties in sustaining a partnership to the differing nature 
of each country’s terrorist threats. U.S.-Russian relations in general are complicated by 
their historic relationship as rivals and their conflicting ideologies. However, the 
literature notes that counterterrorism-specific conflicts are sometimes complicated by 
their differing terrorist threats. Terrorism scholars note that, although the United States 
and Russia both experience terrorism, “each country justifies its policies in terms of the 
terrorist threat, and the nature of that threat is quite different” (Bolt and Cross 2008, 1). 
Despite the fact that both are being threatened by terrorism, and despite the need for 
shared counterterrorism strategy, cooperation between the U.S. and Russia does not 
always occur. However, recently, the spread of radical Islam and growth of groups, such 
as IS, has been linking the threats. Nonetheless, it is important to note the historical 
differences between the terrorist threats faced by the United States and Russia because 
these differences have contributed to counterterrorism failures in the past and may 
continue to do so in the future.  
Foreign radicals, mostly Saudi nationals, executed the 9/11 attacks (Bolt et al. 
2008). Following the 9/11 attacks the United States was mostly focused on external 
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terrorist threats. The 9/11 attacks brought Islamic terrorism to the forefront of 
international security; however, Russia had been battling jihadi terrorism in Chechnya 
since the 1990s (Stent 2014). The breakup of the Soviet Union in the 1990s produced a 
number of independent Muslim republics, which did not include Chechnya (Stent 2014). 
In November 1991, Chechnya claimed independence and Al-Qaeda leaders promised 
assistance to the separatists in Chechnya (Bodansky 2007). There was constant violence 
along the border and Moscow became concerned with the increasing threat of separatist 
activity in Chechnya (Stent 2014). So much so that Moscow invaded Chechnya in 1994 
(Bodansky 2007). In June 1995, Chechen rebels raided a hospital in Budennovsk, a city 
in southern Russia, and took 2,500 people hostage (Bodansky 2007). The crisis ended 
with an agreement to end hostilities; however, violence continued (Bodansky 2007). 
Chechen rebels invaded neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan, which led Russia to 
invade again in 1999 (Bodansky 2007). Russia viewed the Chechen separatists as 
terrorists that threatened the territorial integrity of Russia; however, the West deemed the 
separatists as “freedom fighters” (Stent 2014). The West refused to acknowledge the 
separatists as terrorists and deemed Russia’s actions in Chechnya as human rights abuses.  
Since the 1990s, U.S. criticism of Russian actions in the two Chechen wars has 
been a major Russian grievance. The United States refused to “recognize that Russia was 
dealing with a serious threat that began as a separatist movement and subsequently 
developed into a terrorist movement” (Stent 2014, 267). Putin criticized the United States 
for refusing to extradite Chechen rebels and applying “double standards” in the global 
fight against terrorism (Bolt et al. 2008). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted, “Those 
who killed the children in Beslan and seized planes for the attack on America are 
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creatures of the same breed” (Herd, Azizian, and Yixuan 2008, 89). Russian leaders attest 
that the United States was vulnerable to the 9/11 attacks, and the Boston Marathon 
bombings in 2014, because it refused to acknowledge the terrorist threat from Chechens 
and refused to work with Russia to combat it (Stent 2014). U.S. condemnation of Russian 
actions in Chechnya, and U.S. refusal to acknowledge the separatists as terrorists, put 
great strain on U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation.  
The differing nature of the U.S. and Russian terrorist threat does strain relations. 
However, when jihadi terrorists attacked the United States, the threats began to converge. 
The 9/11 attacks led the United States to be more sympathetic to the Russian cause and 
less critical of Russian actions in Chechnya (Bolt et al. 2008). The United States is 
sometimes still critical of Russian actions in Chechnya. Likewise, Russia has been critical 
of certain U.S. actions during its War on Terror, specifically in Iraq. Despite certain areas 
of divergence regarding counterterrorism, both countries have expressed a great concern 
for stopping the spread of global terrorism and maintaining a U.S.-Russian partnership 
against terrorism.  
Shortcomings of the Current Literature on U.S.-Russian Relations 
There is extensive literature on the general status of U.S.-Russian relations. The 
literature discusses how history’s influence and conflicting foreign-policy agendas strain 
relations with Russia. However, despite frequently strained relations, the literature 
demonstrates that cooperation is possible between the United States and Russia. Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been four resets in U.S.-Russian relations, which 
were initiated with the intent of bettering U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation. 
Nonetheless, issues arose such as a change in leadership or conflicting foreign-policy 
interests, which ultimately ended each reset. The current literature does not observe 
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changes in the levels of counterterrorism cooperation, a shared interest, throughout the 
cycles of conflict and cooperation. While the study of Chechen terrorism is important to 
understanding cooperation difficulties between the United States and Russia, it is 
imperative to understand how the general status of U.S.-Russian relations affects U.S.-
Russian counterterrorism cooperation. In this thesis, I argue that the general status of 
U.S.-Russian relations, not a differing nature of a terrorist threat, influences the frequency 
of U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation. 
The literature does note that the 9/11 attacks issued in a reset of U.S.-Russian 
relations, but does not observe counterterrorism cooperation consistently in the period 
following the 9/11 attacks. Following the 9/11 attacks, instances of conflict, such as the 
Georgia and the Ukraine crisis, strained U.S.-Russian relations. Throughout the periods 
of conflict and cooperation following the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda continued to spread and 
IS formed. The literature notes factors, such as differing threats, that hinder 
counterterrorism cooperation, but does not observe how geopolitical conflicts on other 
foreign-policy issues affect counterterrorism cooperation. Without an understanding of 
how often and under which circumstances counterterrorism cooperation occurs, creating 
an effective counterterrorism policy is difficult. 
My findings aim to fill the current gap in which no comprehensive study exists on 
levels of counterterrorism cooperation over the course of U.S.- Russian relations. The 
United States and Russia align on combatting terrorism; however, the literature shows 
that cooperation between the United States and Russia is not guaranteed. Bettering 
counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Russia begins with a 
comprehensive understanding of how conflicting foreign-policy interests or a heightened 
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security threat affect counterterrorism cooperation. Through analyzing specific conditions 
and situations surrounding counterterrorism agreements, my research may reveal a 
pattern that demonstrates the likelihood of counterterrorism cooperation depending on the 
state of general U.S.-Russian relations. 
Theory 	  
 Both the IR theories on general cooperation and the literature specifically 
discussing U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation do not offer a sufficient framework 
to predict which circumstances make U.S.-Russian cooperation more or less likely. The 
literature does not discuss how counterterrorism cooperation is affected when other U.S. 
and Russian interests are being threatened. Both countries pursue counterterrorism 
initiatives, but they also pursue other foreign policies and some of these conflict. When 
relations are favorable between the United States and Russia, it is logical to assume that 
counterterrorism cooperation is easily sustained. However, relations are not always 
favorable between the United States and Russia as conflicts arise, such as Georgia or the 
Ukraine crisis, which strain relations. Nonetheless, terrorist groups form and attacks 
occur that may require the United States and Russia to put conflicting interests aside to 
cooperate. In this thesis, I seek to identify how the number of counterterrorism 
cooperation instances changes depending on the general state of U.S.-Russian relations.  
 I argue that it is possible to determine which conflicting foreign-policy interests 
will affect counterterrorism cooperation by determining which interests a country 
considers vital. Cooperation occurs when states share an interest and conflict occurs 
when states pursue conflicting interests. However, two states can pursue both shared and 
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conflicting interests simultaneously, which complicates whether states choose 
cooperation or isolation. I view cooperation failures as consequences of agenda sacrifices 
leaders must make when pursuing a multifaceted foreign-policy agenda. Foreign-policy 
goals are not self-contained issues existing in isolation, but instead they are often linked 
to other foreign policies on the agenda, earlier issues, and domestic politics (Keohane 
1984). Leaders and policymakers are often forced to make agenda sacrifices in pursuit of 
a foreign-policy interest. Depending on the interest, leaders may be more or less willing 
to sacrifice other interests in pursuit of one particular interest. Additionally, leaders may 
be more or less willing to sacrifice one particular interest in pursuit of other ones. This 
results in a hierarchy of interests. 
The Commission of America’s National Interests groups a country’s interests into 
four categories: vital, extremely important, important, and less important (Allison and 
Blackwill 2000). I view this language to be applicable to ranking issues on a country’s 
foreign-policy agenda. Grouping interests into these categories results in a hierarchy of 
interests that makes predicting a country’s behavior possible. Countries will choose to 
cooperate in pursuit of a shared interest when there is no conflict with other parts of their 
foreign-policy agendas. Additionally, countries will continue to cooperate on vital 
interests even if they are pursing conflicting interests considered extremely important, 
important, or less important. In contrast, countries may choose isolation rather than 
cooperation if an international crisis or policy disagreement is threatening other vital 
foreign-policy interests on their agenda.  
Identifying the value a country places on a particular interest will determine how 
fervently a country is willing to pursue it. However, a country’s hierarchy of interests is 
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difficult to discern because where interests fall on the hierarchy depends on a variety of 
factors. These factors include domestic politics, government type, and economic 
priorities. Additionally, interests will evolve with time and changing leadership. For 
example, interests considered vital to one country under one president may differ from 
the vital interests under the previous president.  
The four resets in U.S.-Russian relations ultimately ended due to a change in 
leadership or an international conflict. Because of the foreign-policy interests of the new 
leader or the interest being threatened, or pursued, through the international conflict, 
isolation was preferred to cooperation. I argue that each resets’ end signifies that states’ 
interests motivate their actions and desire to cooperate. Identifying how vital an interest is 
to the United States and Russia can aid in determining how fervently each country is 
willing to pursue it. The literature notes that both the United States and Russia consider 
counterterrorism a vital interest (Weitz 2015). Additionally, U.S.-Russian vital interests 
overlap on matters such as nuclear nonproliferation and climate change (Stent 2014). 
However in spite of shared vital interests, the United States and Russia also pursue 
conflicting vital interests. For example, tension results from Russia’s desire to maintain 
the status quo in Europe and prevent the spread of Western democracy and the U.S. 
desire to promote Western democracy in post-Soviet countries and the Middle East (Stent 
2012).  
Within the category of vital interests itself, countries may make agenda sacrifices 
and pursue one vital interest at the expense of other vital interests. In my thesis I seek to 
determine how fervently the United States and Russian pursue joint counterterrorism 
cooperation. Converging interests and diverging interests between the United States and 
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Russia result in cycles of conflict and cooperation. If a reset ends due to a geopolitical 
conflict such as Ukraine, I seek to determine if levels of counterterrorism cooperation are 
affected. If so, I will observe whether a heightened security threat, due to a recent 
terrorist attack, trumps the other foreign policy concerns and brings the two countries 
back to cooperation.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I view spectacular terrorist attacks as having the 
greatest likelihood of increasing cooperation. A terrorist attack is considered spectacular 
based on the shock value it creates, which depends on the target and number of 
casualties. Islamic terrorism is the shared threat between the United States and Russia; 
however, I do not expect every Islamic terrorist attack around the world to lead the 
United States and Russia to increase cooperation. I view the security environment for 
both nations to become heightened enough to illicit increased cooperation when the 
terrorist attack occurs in places where terrorist attacks are rare, it is on an U.S. or Russian 
embassy abroad, or it is in major cities in either the United States or Russia. Additionally 
transnational attacks, such as Chechen terrorists on U.S. soil, will also illicit increased 
cooperation. These characteristics make the terrorist attack spectacular according to the 
United States and Russia and make both countries concerned with the attack. There is a 
constant threat of Islamic terrorism for both countries; however, I believe only a 
spectacular terrorist attack will heighten both countries’ security environments and 
increase the perceived benefits of U.S.-Russian cooperation.  
Hypothesis 	  
I predict that U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation will occur most 
frequently when relations are favorable between the two countries. Countries pursue a 
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range of foreign-policy issues and favorable relations between the United States and 
Russia results when they are not pursing conflicting interests. The pursuit of conflicting 
interests is minimal and consequently, the desire to cooperate is strong. Cooperation on 
counterterrorism matters will be more sustainable when the United States and Russia do 
not have to make agenda sacrifices to pursue it. When an international crisis or action by 
one country begins to threaten the favorable relations between United States and Russia, I 
expect counterterrorism cooperation will decline. I do not anticipate that it will 
completely cease because both countries view counterterrorism as a vital interest; 
however, because there are other vital interests being threatened, counterterrorism 
cooperation will prove more difficult. Leaders will have to determine if the pursuit of 
conflicting interests is worth hampering counterterrorism negotiations.  
 Because states are rational actors and are concerned with their survival, I predict 
that a terrorist attack carried out by a jihadi terrorist group will trigger an increase in 
cooperation, regardless if relations are favorable or hostile. Jihadi terrorist groups are 
comprised of global networks with the ability to instill global fear and destruction. 
Terrorist attacks on a country’s soil shows that a country is not immune to the destruction 
of terrorism, as was the case with the 9/11 attacks and the United States. Additionally, a 
terrorist attack will also raise the security risk globally. Terrorist attacks expose the 
vulnerability of countries and the international system as whole; therefore, I predict 
international cooperation will increase following a terrorist attack.  
To test my hypothesis, I will compare three timelines. The first will consist of the 
general relations of U.S. –Russian relations, the second will show instances of terrorist 
attacks, and the third will identify instances of U.S.-Russian counterterrorism 
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cooperation. Below is a graphic that represents my hypothesis. The graphic shows 
counterterrorism cooperation as occurring most frequently during times of favorable 
relations and shows a spike in counterterrorism cooperation after an attack, regardless if 
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 Following the Cold War, the literature discusses four resets in U.S.-Russian 
relations, which attempted to revive the partnership. My investigation begins right before 
the fourth reset in 2009 and ends in December 2014. The 2009 reset begins to deteriorate 
in 2012 and ultimately ends in the summer of 2013. I examine the relationship between 
2009 and 2014 because it includes both a period of positive relations and a period of 
negative relations. As a result, I can observe if counterterrorism cooperation increases, 
decreases, or remains the same throughout periods of conflict and cooperation. The 
literature discusses conflicts and cooperation that arise during this period, but in order to 
ensure an accurate representation of U.S.-Russian relations, I research and record events 
of conflict and cooperation to determine the nature of U.S.–Russian relations between 
2009 and 2014. 
 The events I record concern issues on the U.S. and Russian foreign-policy 
agendas not issues on their domestic- policy agendas. I do not do this to disregard the 
importance of domestic politics on the U.S.-Russian partnership. Domestic politics often 
influence where interests fall on the hierarchy; thereby, affecting the agenda sacrifices 
leaders can or are willing to make. However, for this thesis, I view strictly observing the 
pursuit of foreign policies and their influence on the pursuit of counterterrorism 
cooperation as more beneficial to my analysis. Throughout the history of U.S.-Russian 
relations and throughout the changes in leadership, foreign policy disputes regarding 
missile defense, Iran’s nuclear program, and NATO expansion have consistently strained 
relations. I aim to note how conflicts regarding these consistent, international issues 
affect counterterrorism cooperation.  
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 For each year, I record events in their appropriate month. The primary sources I 
use for these events include reports cataloged by the U.S. State Department and the 
Kremlin. Both websites have information regarding telephone calls, meetings, and joint 
statements between Moscow and Washington. Additionally, I include information from 
the United Nations’ website regarding decisions of the UNSC and information from 
NATO’s website regarding NATO’s relations with Russia. I supplement these sources 
with information from news outlets such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, 
and BBC.  
 I consider cooperative exchanges between the United States and Russia as 
signifying that the overall relationship is favorable. I record actions such as signing a law, 
conducting a joint military exercise, attending a summit or bilateral meeting, changing of 
a previously controversial policy, the joint implementation of sanctions, the signing of a 
new treaty, the dropping of sanctions against the other, and a spy swap as instances of 
cooperation between the United States and Russia. Additionally, I record actions such as 
meetings of the Russian-American Public Dialogue Group and the U.S.- Russia Bilateral 
Presidential Commission as instances of cooperation. I also record positive statements by 
U.S. and Russian leadership as instances of cooperation. I include positive statements, in 
addition to actions, because discussions about the desire to cooperate indicate that the 
current status of U.S.-Russian relations is conducive to cooperation, meaning relations 
are favorable.  
 The statements and actions I record concern interests considered vital to U.S. and 
Russian interests. For example, the events concern issues such as national security, 
nuclear proliferation, missile defense, the economy, immigration, and each country’s 
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geopolitical interests in the Middle East. I omit cooperation on issues such as agriculture, 
health, and education. The U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission has working 
groups on these issues, and I do note when the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential meets. 
However, I do not note individual legislation or outcomes from cooperation on issues 
such as agriculture, health, and education because these are not considered vital interests. 
According to the hierarchy of interests, I do not view cooperation or conflict on these 
issues as representative of U.S.-Russian relations as a whole or that a lack of cooperation 
on these issues is capable of hindering counterterrorism cooperation. The four resets 
ended due to conflicts over vital interests such as missile defense systems in Europe, 
Georgia, and Ukraine, not less important interests such as agriculture. Citing cooperation 
on lesser interests during the Ukraine crisis, a vital interest to both nations, is not an 
adequate symbol that general conditions are favorable to cooperation on vital issues.  
I also do not note resolutions passed by the UNSC. Resolutions are passed quite 
frequently. For example, in December 2011 alone, the UNSC passed 11 resolutions. 
Contrastingly, vetoes occur much less frequently. There were seven vetoes between 2009 
and 2014. Because resolutions are passed frequently, on a myriad of topics, they are not 
an accurate representation of relations between the United States and Russia. Resolutions 
are passed consistently and do not offer new information to the nature of U.S.-Russian 
relations. However, since vetoes occur less infrequently, they are representative of a 
policy disagreement that is likely straining U.S.-Russian relations. I mark UNSC vetoes 
as conflicts.  
I also note cooperation between NATO and Russia. I observe both bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia because cooperation or 
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disagreements in international organizations are often representative of U.S.-Russian 
relations as a whole. Both countries use NATO as a forum to cooperate on shared 
interests such as Afghanistan, missile defense, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism. 
But at times, NATO or Russia chooses isolation instead of cooperation. For example, 
NATO suspended cooperation with Russia during the Georgia crisis and suspended 
cooperation again during the Ukraine crisis. An examination of isolation and cooperation 
between NATO and Russia can aid in determining the general status of U.S.-Russian 
relations and reveal a country’s interest preferences. As a result, I record instances of 
cooperation within the NATO-Russian council (NRC), and I also record instances of 
conflict within the NRC. Similarly, I mark instances of cooperation regarding Russia’s 
accession process to the World Trade Organization (WTO) because it represents 
favorable relations and converging interests between the United States and Russia.  
I mark both UNSC vetoes and disagreements within the NRC as moments of 
conflict. Other episodes of conflict include: negative statements by U.S.-Russian 
leadership, the cancellation of a summit meeting, the passing of a law with negative 
implications to one country, expelling an organization from the other country, or 
disobeying a treaty. Additionally, I record cancelled summit meetings where the country 
explicitly stated that it was in response to actions committed by the other country. 
However, often the reasons for canceling a summit meeting are not explicit. For example, 
I note a summit meeting where Obama stated scheduling reasons for cancelling; however, 
there was significant speculation that it was in response to Russia’s actions. I marked this 
instance as conflict because the country made a choice not to cooperate. Below are two 
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examples of how I record instances of cooperation and conflict. Green signifies an 
instance of cooperation and red signifies an instance of conflict.  
April 1-Apr-09 Moscow opens air corridor to Afghanistan. 
 
October 2-Oct-11 Russia vetoes a UNSC resolution regarding action in Syria 
 
Once I record all the events, I then determine the over all status of U.S.-Russian 
relations. I do this on a monthly basis. If multiple instances of cooperation happen in 
December 2012, for example, then the final for December 2012, is a month of favorable 
relations. If four events occur in December 2013, and three are cooperative and one is a 
conflict, then December 2013 is also a month of favorable relations. A majority of either 
cooperation events or conflict events is sufficient to designate the month either favorable 
or unfavorable. While there is a period of conflict during that month, cooperation 
occurred more frequently and signals that relations are favorable between the United 
States and Russia. If a month has no events, I mark it the same as the month before, under 
the assumption that relations remain the same until an instance of conflict or cooperation 
changes them. Below is an example of conflict and cooperation events occurring in the 
same month and the final designation of the month.  
March 
9-Mar-11 
Russia allows U.S. armed forces and equipment to travel through 
Russia. 
9-Mar-11 Medvedev meets with Biden to discuss U.S.-Russian relations. 
22-Mar-11 Medvedev announces concern over UNSC action in Libya. 
24-Mar-11 Medvedev and Obama discuss the WTO and missile defense systems. 
 
Once I determine the general status of U.S. –Russian relations, I record terrorist 
attacks by jihadi terrorist groups that occurred in the United States and in Russia or on 
their embassies abroad. Because Islamic terrorism is the shared threat, I do not record 
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attacks promulgated by domestic terrorist groups such as the U.S. terrorist group, the 
Earth Liberation Front. Attacks by domestic terrorist groups often do not warrant 
international support. Further, I limit the data for terrorist attacks to Islamic terrorist 
attacks on U.S. and Russian soil, including attacks on military bases and embassies. Such 
attacks reveal vulnerabilities of the United States and Russia and draw enough concern to 
warrant cooperation. Additionally, in regards to Russia, I do not record terrorist attacks in 
the North Caucasus region. Although they are Islamic terrorist attacks, the North 
Caucasus region is a hot bed for terrorism and attacks consistently occur. For example, 
Russia’s top law enforcement agency, the Investigative Committee, recorded 31 terrorist 
attacks in 2013 in the North Caucasus. Terrorist attacks that occur so frequently, while 
they constitute a constant security risk to Russia, do not change the security risk to 
external countries, such as the United States. Contrastingly, a terrorist attack in Moscow 
is more likely to draw international attention and lead to calls for increased 
counterterrorism cooperation. Below is an example of a recorded terrorist attack.  
29-Mar-10 Moscow Metro bombings 
 
I then record instances of counterterrorism cooperation. I record events monthly, 
similar to how I record general instances of U.S.-Russian cooperation and conflict. I 
consider counterterrorism cooperation to include meetings of the Counterterrorism 
Working Group, counterterrorism joint military exercises, agreements on the status of 
terrorist groups, counterterrorism policy implementation, and summit meetings on 
counterterrorism. I also include cooperation on nuclear security when the dialogue 
centers on preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons. I do not note UN 
resolutions when recording instances of cooperation in order to determine the status of 
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general U.S.-Russian, but I do record UN resolutions concerning counterterrorism 
cooperation. UN resolutions are passed frequently on a myriad of topics, that I did not 
think they would adequately represent the status of U.S.-Russian relations as a whole, 
however they are useful in determining how often the United States and Russia cooperate 
on counterterrorism specifically. In addition to these cooperation actions, I record joint 
statements and individual speeches about wanting to better counterterrorism cooperation. 
I view these statements and speeches as indicatory of an environment conducive to 




The United States and Russia agree to a Memorandum of Understanding on 
aviation security  
 
Lastly, I only deem instances of counterterrorism cooperation as a direct result of 
a terrorist attack if there is an explicit link. Some events, such as a speech by Putin 
regarding the need to increase intelligence sharing following the Boston Marathon 
bombings, are clearly in response to the terrorist attack. However, sometimes a link is not 
as overt. For example, a Counterterrorism Working Group meeting was scheduled in May 
2010, and a few days before the event a terrorist attack was foiled in Times Square. I 
cannot determine that if the meeting were not already scheduled, the Counterterrorism 
Working Group would have scheduled one to discuss the attempted bombings. However, 
the attack perhaps changed the dialogue of the already existing meeting. In this thesis, I 
use a conservative approach and only account for the actions with an explicit link to a 
recent terrorist attack.  
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Results 
The events regarding U.S. –Russian general relations, terrorist attacks, and 
counterterrorism cooperation results in three timelines. I use the below graphics to 
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 The first timeline I establish indicates the general condition of U.S.-Russian 
relations. Months designated as favorable signify months in which a majority of the 
interactions between the U.S. and Russia are positive encounters aimed at bettering 
cooperation. Months designated as unfavorable signify months in which a majority of the 
interactions between the U.S. and Russia are conflicts. Of the 72 months between 2009 
and 2014, there are 27 unfavorable months and 45 favorable months. 2009 and 2010, the 
first two years of my study, contain only favorable months. 2011 contains nine favorable 
months and three unfavorable months. 2012 contains eight favorable months and four 
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unfavorable months. 2013 contains four favorable months and eight unfavorable months. 
Lastly, 2014 contains only unfavorable months. In 2011, the United States and Russia 
start experiencing periods of disagreement, culminating with a final period of only 
unfavorable months beginning in July 2013 and lasting through 2014.  
 The set of criteria I estabslished to judge which events and interactions I would 
include results in a timeline that fits with the overall trend of U.S.-Russian relations 
discussed in the literature. Following a period of negative relations between the United 
States and Russia due to the 2008 conflict in Georgia, relations began to improve 
following Obama’s reset speech in 2009. My timeline of U.S.-Russian relations 
represents this reset in relations as 2009 and 2010 are years of favorable relations. The 
literature notes the unsustainability of the reset due to conflicts surrounding Edward 
Snowden, Syria, missile defense, and NATO enlargement. My timeline represents the 
disintegration of the reset as the number of unfavorable months increases in 2011, 2012, 
2013, and 2014. The literature notes that the reset ultimately ends in summer 2013 and 
the Ukraine crisis begins to heavily strain U.S.-Russian relations in 2014. My timeline 
contains a period of negative relations beginning in July 2013 that lasts through 
December 2014, representing the end of the reset and the strain caused by the Ukraine 
crisis. The discussion of U.S.-Russian relations in the literature supports the state of U.S.-
Russian relations offered by my timeline.  
 I formulate an additional timeline that notes instances of counterterrorism 
cooperation. Despite the period of cooperation givingway to a period of conflict, the 
literature notes that terrorism remains a shared concern for both the United States and 
Russia through 2014. My timeline represents this shared concern, as there are instances 
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of counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Russia each year. There 
are five in 2009, six in 2010, 12 in 2011, five in 2012, nine in 2013, and seven in 2014. 
Of the 44 instances of counterterrorism cooperation between 2009 and 2014, 16 occurred 
during unfavorable months and 28 occurred during favorable months. There are 27 total 
unfavorable months and 16 divided by 27 results in 0.59 instances of counterterrorism 
cooperation on average during unfavorable months. There are 45 total favorable months 
and 28 divided by 45 results in 0.62 instances of counterterrorism cooperation on average 
during favorable months. There is a 0.03 difference between instances of 
counterterrorism cooperation on average between favorable and unfavorable months. A 
small difference indicates that counterterrorism cooperation between the United States 
and Russia continues despite whether relations are favorable or unfavorable between the 
United States and Russia. 
 The literature notes a decline in U.S.-Russian relations, culminating with the end 
of the reset in the summer 2013. Before the official end of the reset, it is arguable 
whether relations were truly unfavorable. As a result, I also analyze a more conservative 
estimate that compares instances of U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation before 
and after the 2009 reset’s ending. The literature notes a stark contrast in relations between 
these two periods. However, changing the numbers to compare January 2009-June 2013 
to July 2013- December 2014 results in a similar conclusion when using numbers exactly 
from my timeline. Instead of 45 favorable months, there are 54 favorable months and 
instead of 27 unfavorable months, there are 18 unfavorable months. With the new month 
distribution, 12 moments of counterterrorism cooperation occur during unfavorable 
months, while 32 moments of counterterrorism cooperation occur during favorable 
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months. 12 moments of cooperation divided by 18 unfavorable months equals 0.66 
moments of cooperation per unfavorable month on average. 32 moments of cooperation 
divided by 54 favorable months equals 0.59 moments of cooperation per favorable month 
on average.  
Looking at counterterrorism cooperation month by month using my timeline 
shows counterterrorism cooperation occurring more frequently during favorable months 
than unfavorable months; however, the difference is only 0.03. On the other hand, 
comparing counterterrorism cooperation before and after the end of the 2009 reset shows 
counterterrorism cooperation occurring more frequently during unfavorable months. 
However, again the difference is small, only 0.07. Comparing counterterrorism 
cooperation using my timeline, or more generally before and after the end of the 2009 
reset, the likelihood of counterterrorism cooperation occurring during unfavorable and 
favorable months is similar, with a difference of 0.04.  
I compile a third time line comprising of jihadi terrorist attacks on U.S.-Russian 
soil. A terrorist attack and a heightened security threat may explain sustained cooperation 
between the United States and Russia regardless of the status of general U.S.-Russian 
relations. There is at least one terrorist attack per year in my study, except in 2014. 2013 
contains the most instances of terrorist attacks, with five terrorist attacks. Below is a chart 
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November 27, 2009 Nevsky Express bombing 
March 29, 2010 Moscow Metro bombings 
January 24, 2011 Suicide attack at Moscow's Domodedovo airport.  
September 11, 2012 Attack on U.S. mission in Benghazi 
February 1, 2013  Attack on U.S. embassy in Ankara 
April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombings  
October 21, 2013 Volgograd bus bombing  
December 29, 2013 Volgograd trolley bombing 
December 30, 2013 Volgograd trolley bombing  
 
U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation is a response to the continued threat 
posed by Al-Qaeda and IS. Terrorism is a continued threat for both countries, but a 
terrorist attack on one’s own soil increases fear and reveals a country’s vulnerability. 
Through my analysis, I aim to note whether this vulnerability and fear leads to increased 
cooperation. More importantly, I want to observe whether a terrorist attack explains 
cooperation during a period of unfavorable conditions, and whether without the attack, 
the United States and Russia would still cooperate.  
Following each terrorist attack in Russia, Obama or the White House press 
secretary issued a statement condemning the violence and reiterating U.S.-Russian 
commitment to preventing the spread of terrorism. For example, following the suicide 
attack at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport in 2011, Obama announced, “I strongly 
condemn this outrageous act of terrorism against the Russian people” and White House 
press secretary Robert Gibbs said the United States would extend any assistance the 
Russians may request (Ross, Ferran, and Siegel 2011). Similarly, following each terrorist 
attack on American soil, Putin offered his condolences and also reiterated U.S.-Russian 
commitment to preventing the spread of terrorism. For example, following the terrorist 
attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi in 2012, Putin commented, “I really expect that 
this tragedy will motivate us all to intensify our joint – I should emphasize the word 
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joint – struggle against extremism and terrorist threats” (The Kremlin 2012).  
U.S. and Russian leadership consistently issued statements following a terrorist 
attack; nonetheless, from my research I note no additional instances of cooperation that 
were directly linked to the terrorist attack. However, there are two exceptions. In these 
two cases, I find additional reasons sparking additional cooperation. Each terrorist attack 
I record is carried out by an Islamic terrorist organization because Islamic terrorism 
concerns both countries. However, countries do not pursue additional action beyond 
issuing a statement unless there was an additional stake in the outcome. The two terrorist 
attacks that result in action beyond a statement were the Boston Marathon bombings and 
the Volgograd trolley bombings. 
The two Boston Marathon bombers were Islamic terrorists, but they were also 
Chechen immigrants (Stent 2014). The identification of the terrorists as Chechens 
reopened an emotional debate for the Russians and reminded them of U.S. criticism of 
Russia’s actions in the two Chechen wars (Stent 2014). For Russians, the Boston 
Marathon bombings validated their concerns in Chechnya. The United States had a stake 
because the attack occurred on its soil, and the Russians had a stake because the attackers 
were Chechens. Furthermore, both countries had an additional stake in furthering 
cooperation following the bombing because the attack revealed clear intelligence failures 
between the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) (Stent 2014). Reports show the FSB communicated with the FBI about the 
Tsarnaev brothers years before the attack occurred and had asked for more information 
(Stent 2014). However, the FBI did not give additional information (Stent 2014). On the 
Russian side, the FSB did not share with the FBI all the information it knew regarding the 
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Tsarnaev brothers. Chechen terrorists attacking the United States called for U.S.-Russian 
cooperation more so than did previous attacks by Chechen terrorist attacks on Russian 
soil. Additionally, the Boston Marathon bombings reveled the need for cooperation to 
better intelligence sharing between the United States and Russia. Following the terrorist 
attacks, Putin and Obama discussed ways to improve U.S.-Russian counterterrorism 
cooperation on at least two different occasions.  
Both the United States and Russia had interests in cooperating following the 
Boston Marathon bombings. Likewise, both the United States and Russia had interests in 
cooperating following the Volgograd trolley bombings in December 2013. Vilayat 
Dagestan, a subgroup of the Caucasus Emirate, claimed responsibility for the Volgograd 
trolley bombings (Jenkins 2014). The attack sparked international concern because of the 
upcoming Olympics that were to be held in Sochi in February 2014 (Jenkins 2014). Sochi 
neighbors the North Caucasus region and the leader of the Caucasus Emirate, Doku 
Umarov, vowed to attack the Sochi Olympics (Jenkins 2014). U.S. leadership, such as 
Obama and National Security Council (NSA) spokesperson Caitlin Hayden, issued 
statements on bettering cooperation immediately following the attacks in December 2013 
(Jenkins 2014). In January 2014, Obama and Putin met to discuss Sochi security 
cooperation. Also in January 2014, General Martin E. Dempsey and General Valery V. 
Gerasimov met to discuss technology exchanges to ensure Sochi security (Shanker 2014). 
Meetings and discussions between the United States and Russia continued following the 
December attacks in Volgograd because the attacks revealed the security vulnerabilities 
of the upcoming Olympics (Shanker 2014). Russia had a stake in ensuring security 
because the world was looking to it as the host of the games. Similarly, the United States 
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had a stake in ensuring security for U.S. athletes and attendees.  
Originally, I predicted U.S. and Russian counterterrorism cooperation would 
occur most frequently when relations are favorable between the two countries. 
Additionally, I predicted that when an international crisis or action by one country begins 
to threaten the favorable relations between United States and Russia, counterterrorism 
cooperation would decline. However, I anticipated that cooperation would not cease 
completely because both countries view counterterrorism as a vital interest. According to 
the timelines I established concerning the general status of U.S.-Russian relations and 
instances of counterterrorism cooperation, I was correct in assuming that cooperation 
would not cease completely during periods of unfavorable conditions. However, I was 
incorrect in hypothesizing cooperation would decline. Whether looking at my numbers, 
or a more conservative estimate, the difference between average cooperative events per 
unfavorable month and average cooperative events per favorable month, is less than 0.1. 
According to my research, levels of counterterrorism cooperation remain the same, 
regardless of policy disagreements on other vital interests. 
I also predicted that a terrorist attack carried out by a jihadi terrorist group would 
trigger an increase in cooperation, regardless if relations were favorable or hostile. 
Terrorist attacks on U.S. and Russian soil resulted in statements by the other country on 
the need for bettering cooperation. However, instances of cooperation usually did not go 
beyond that. Counterterrorism cooperation is consistent between the United States and 
Russia from 2009 to 2014, as both countries perceive a consistent threat of terrorism. A 
terrorist attack only resulted in cooperation exceeding an initial statement when the 
United States and Russia both had an additional stake or interest in the circumstances 
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surrounding the attack. The Boston Marathon occurred on U.S. soil and exposed U.S. 
vulnerabilities, automatically upping the stake the United States had. However, Russia 
also had additional interests beyond that of generally preventing the spread of terrorism 
because Chechen terrorists carried out the attack. Lastly, the attack demonstrated clear 
intelligence failures between the FSB and FBI, giving the United States and Russia 
further reason to increase cooperation. Similar to the Boston Marathon bombings, the 
Volgograd bombings also resulted in cooperation beyond an initial statement. The 
Volgograd bombings brought into question the security of the imminent Olympic games. 
Russia had an interest in protecting its homeland and hosting a secure Olympic games, 
while the United States had additional interests in securing the safety of its athletes and 
citizens attending the games.  
The Boston Marathon bombings occurred during a favorable month before the 
reset ended. The Volgograd bombings occurred during an unfavorable month following 
the end of the reset. Both attacks led to increased U.S.-Russian counterterrorism 
cooperation, despite the general status of relations. The desire to cooperate following 
these attacks further reinforces that the general status of U.S-Russian relations has no 
affect on levels of counterterrorism cooperation.  
Conclusion 	  
 My findings support that counterterrorism cooperation is a vital interest for the 
United States and Russia. Additionally, both countries are willing to pursue 
counterterrorism cooperation despite conflicts regarding other vital interests. Moreover, it 
does not take a terrorist attack on either country’s soil to bring about cooperation. The 
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literature notes that counterterrorism is an important policy concern for both countries 
and both countries note the value in a partnership against terrorism. My findings support 
this statement because there was consistent cooperation between the United States and 
Russia between 2009-2014. Additionally, the literature notes the differing nature of the 
terrorist threat faced by the United States and Russia as a possible hindrance to 
cooperation. While that may have been true prior to 2009, my research does not show 
differing natures of terrorist threats as leading to cooperation failures. Following the 9/11 
attacks, the continued growth of Al-Qaeda and the rise of IS have resulted in a 
converging threat for the United States and Russia. As a result, there is continued 
counterterrorism cooperation between 2009-2014.  
 My findings also have implications for counterterrorism policy. Primarily, 
policymakers and counterterrorism working groups should always work to better 
cooperation, regardless of the general status of U.S.-Russian relations. My findings 
indicate that the United States and Russia are willing to pursue counterterrorism 
cooperation, even if concerns arise regarding relative gains regarding other foreign-policy 
matters, such as NATO expansion. Presently, the United States and Russia are confronted 
with the growth of IS. Despite issues regarding Syria and Ukraine, my findings support a 
positive outlook for continued counterterrorism cooperation against IS in the future.  
 Additionally, my findings impact the study of international relations. First, it 
demonstrates that cooperation on certain issues is possible even if relations between two 
countries are strained. As the mixed strategies theory notes, the pursuit of absolute or 
relative gains varies depending on the issue and nature of the threat. However, my 
findings demonstrate that it is possible for a country to pursue an interest with a concern 
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for absolute gains, while also pursing an interest with a concern for relative gains. 
Countries are capable of pursing multiple foreign policies simultaneously. As a result, 
identifying a country’s hierarchy of interests and observing its decisions within that 
hierarchy best accomplishes predicting a country’s behavior. Additionally, observing 
how a country pursues multiple interests within the same level on the hierarchy will also 
reveal valuable information that can aid in predicting a country’s behavior. For example, 
the consistent pursuit of counterterrorism cooperation following the end of Obama’s reset 
and during the Ukraine crisis reveals that counterterrorism cooperation is high on the 
hierarchy for both the United States and Russia.  
The study I carried out was subjective. I personally established criteria to 
determine which events constitute cooperation and which constitute conflict. I attempted 
to establish a strong criterion by using research from a wide variety of sources and 
attempting to eliminate bias. Unfortunately, I am unable to unmask the true intentions of 
leaders and politicians. If Putin announces he wishes to better U.S.-Russian relations, but 
does not actually intend to do so, there is no way for me to know his true intention. 
Instead, because both Putin and Obama have insulted each other directly, I chose to note 
statements of positivity as contributing to favorable relations and mark negative 
statements as straining relations. An additional limitation to my analysis is my limited 
access to information. There may be classified events of counterterrorism cooperation or 
other exchanges in general between the United States and Russia that I do not have 
access to. Additional events could alter my results.  
 Despite limitations, my findings aid in a better understanding of which conditions 
make cooperation more or less likely between the United States and Russia. While, my 
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study did not find that the pursuit of other vital interests affects the pursuit of 
counterterrorism cooperation, it is possible there are other influences, such as domestic 
politics. Domestic politics affect where foreign policies fall on the hierarchy and how 
fervently a country pursues a foreign policy. As a result, if I were to extend this study, I 
would also look at the impact of domestic politics on counterterrorism cooperatiom.  
Additionally, a further study could examine general cooperation and issue specific 
cooperation between the United States and other rivals, such as China. Ultimately, further 
research on differing influences, or on two different rival superpowers, can help answer 
the theoretical question; “Under which conditions and on what issues is cooperation more 
(or less) likely between two ideologically different superpowers?” 
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Appendix 
The General Status of U.S.-Russian Relations 
2009 
 
January      
February      
March 
1-Mar-09 
NATO foreign ministers resume formal meetings under the 
NRC.  
6-Mar-09 Hilary Clinton presents Sergei Lavrov with a “reset button.” 
9-Mar-11 
Medvedev and Biden discuss prospects of U.S.-Russian 
relations. 
20-Mar-09 
The Russian-American Public Dialogue Group meets in 
Russia. 
April 1-Apr-09 Moscow opens air corridor to Afghanistan. 
May     
June     
July  6-Jul-09 U.S.- Russian agreement on military transit in Afghanistan. 
6-Jul-09 
Announcement of the creation of the U.S.-Russian Bilateral 
Presidential Commission. 
7-Jul-09 Obama gives his “reset speech.” 
August      
17-Sep-09 
Obama announces he is abandoning his plans for missile 
defense shield in Eastern Europe. 
September 23-Sep-09 
Obama and Medvedev agree to cooperate on START and 
nuclear energy. 
October  26-Sep-09 
Medvedev acknowledges the importance of Pittsburgh 
communiqué. 
November     
December  Dec-09 First formal NRC ministerial meeting since the Georgia crisis. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




  February  




The United States and Russia cooperate regarding the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  
8-Apr-10 The United States and Russia agree to a new START treaty.  
13-Apr-10 
Washington signs into law an agreement with Russia on 
plutonium disposition. 
14-Apr-10 Medvedev attends a nuclear security summit in D.C. 
May 
10-May-10 Obama revives the civilian nuclear deal with Russia. 
13-May-10 
Obama and Medvedev discuss various foreign-policy issues 
on the phone.  
19-May-10 
Russia and the United States agree to impose sanctions on 
Iran. 
21-May-10 
The United States drops sanctions against the Russian state 
arms export agency. 
June 18-Jun-10 
Medvedev gives a positive interview with the Wall Street 
Journal. 
25-Jun-10 Medvedev visits D.C. and agrees to ten joint statements. 





NRC foreign ministers meet in New York to discuss 
cooperation. 
October  
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2011 
 
January  28-Jan-11 Medvedev ratifies the new START treaty.  
February  18-Feb-11 







Russia allows U.S. armed forces and equipment to travel 
through Russia. 
9-Mar-11 
Medvedev meets with Biden to discuss U.S.-Russian 
relations. 
22-Mar-11 Medvedev announces concern over UNSC action in Libya. 
24-Mar-11 
Medvedev and Obama discuss WTO bid and missile defense 
systems. 
April Apr-11 The NRC launches the Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund.  






 A Russian submarine takes part in the NATO exercise Bold 
Monarch.  
1-Jun-11 
For the first time in three years, the NRC defense ministers 
meet. 
2-Jun-11 
Italy, the United States, and Russia discuss WTO cooperation 
with NATO. 
7-Jun-11 
Medvedev signs into law an agreement with the United States 





The NRC meets in Sochi, Russia to discuss missile defense 
and other common interests. 
11-Jul-11 
Medvedev and Obama speak on the phone about cooperation 
efforts. 
21-Jul-11 NASA begins to rely on only Russian rockets. 
August 3-Aug-11 Medvedev and Obama discuss Russia's accession to the WTO. 
September 
  October  2-Oct-11 Russia vetoes a UNSC resolution regarding action in Syria.  
November 13-Nov-11 
Medvedev and Obama speak negatively on the sidelines of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. 
22-Nov-11 
The United States decides not to abide by the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with regards to Russia. 
December  
8-Dec-11 
Putin accuses the United States of encouraging protests 
against Russian elections. 
16-Dec-11 
Obama calls Medvedev to congratulate Russia on the WTO 
bid. 
16-Dec-11 Russia wins bid to join the WTO. 
 
 	  	  




  February  4-Feb-12 Russia vetoes a UNSC resolution regarding action in Syria. 
March 7-Mar-12 
Joint statement on cooperation on the Semipalatinsk nuclear 
test site. 
24-Mar-12 Putin returns to the Kremlin. 
26-Mar-12 Obama and Medvedev attend a nuclear security summit. 
April Apr-12 
NRC foreign ministers meet in Brussels to discuss 
cooperation. 
May 18-May-12 Putin does not attend a meeting at Camp David. 
June 19-Jun-12 




19-Jul-12 Russia vetoes a UNSC resolution regarding action in Syria.  
30-Jul-12 
The United States and Russia ratify a law concerning 
adoption cooperation.  
30-Jul-12 





Sep-12 U.S.- Russian visa agreement enters into force. 
8-Sep-12 
Putin meets with Hilary Clinton at Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation summit. 
Sep-12 
Russia expels the United States Agency for International 
Development. 
October  




The United States repeals the Jackson–Vain amendment for 
Russia. 
14-Dec-12 
The U.S. Congress ratifies the Sergei Magnitsky 
Accountability and Rule of Law Act, intending to punish 
Russia officials. 
28-Dec-12 
Russia adopted the Dima Yakovlev Law, intending to 
sanction certain U.S. citizens. 
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2013 
 
January  31-Jan-13 Moscow cancels bilateral crime fighting agreements.  
February  
  March 1-Mar-13 
Obama and Putin discuss on the phone the importance of 
cooperation. 
April 29-Apr-13 
Obama and Putin discuss cooperation in Syria and plan two 
times to meet in the future. 
May 
  June 14-Jun-13 
Obama and Putin sign a new bilateral framework on threat 
reduction regarding nuclear weapons. 
July  12-Jul-13 
Press briefing by U.S. press secretary Jay Carney regarding 
Edward Snowden. 
August 
1-Aug-13 Russia grants Edward Snowden asylum. 
7-Aug-13 Obama criticizes new Russian anti-gay laws.  
7-Aug-13 Obama cancels September meeting with Putin. 
September  
5-Sep-13 
Putin calls John Kerry a liar and warns against U.S. airstrikes 
in Syria. 
12-Sep-13 Putin warns against U.S. airstrikes in Syria. 
14-Sep-13 
Kerry and Lavrov agree on Syria’s arsenal of chemical 
weapons. 
October  Oct-13 
Putin revokes an April 2012 presidential decree that created a 
special envoy for missile shield discussions with NATO.  
Oct-13 
Putin invalidates an order that created a working group on 
missile defense cooperation with NATO. 
November 
  December  
   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 	  	  












2-Mar-14 NATO condemns Russia’s military escalation in Crimea.  
6-Mar-14 Obama signs Executive Order 13660. 
15-Mar-14 Russia vetoes UNSC resolution regarding action in Syria. 
16-Mar-14 
NATO member states declare that they do not recognize the 
Russian-supported referendum held in Crimea. 
17-Mar-14 
Obama issues Executive Order 13661, which sanctions those 
involved with the crisis in Ukraine. 
20-Mar-14 
Obama issues a new executive order expanding on Executive 
Orders 13660 and 13661. 
April Apr-14 
All practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO 
and Russia is suspended. 
May 22-May-14 Russia vetoes UNSC resolution regarding action in Syria.  
June 24-Jun-14 






The United States finds Russia in violation of Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces treaty.  
17-Jul-14 Putin discusses BRICS summit with Obama. 
17-Jul-14 




September  5-Sep-14 
NATO leaders demand that Russia stops and withdraws its 
forces from Ukraine. 
16-Sep-14 
NATO does not recognize the elections held in Ukraine on 
September 14, 2014. 
October    31-Oct-14 NATO condemns Russia's actions in Ukraine. 
November 24-Nov-14 
NATO does not recognize an agreement between Abkhazia 
and Russia. 
December  
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  February  
  March 
  April 1-Apr-09 
Obama and Medvedev agree to enhance cooperation on 
threats of nuclear terrorism. 
May 




At the Moscow Summit, Washington and Moscow discuss 
cooperation initiatives for nuclear terrorism. 
6-Jul-09 
At the Moscow Summit, Washington and Moscow discuss 
cooperation initiatives for nuclear terrorism. 
8-Jul-09 
At the Moscow Summit, Washington and Moscow discuss 
cooperation initiatives for nuclear terrorism. 
August 
  September 
  October  Oct-09 
Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force report: 
"Tackling the Finance of Terrorism." 
November 





  February  
    
March 
29-Mar-10 Obama condemns Moscow Metro bombings. 




25-May-10 Counterterrorism Working Group Meeting 
26-May-10 Counterterrorism Working Group Meeting 
27-May-10 Counterterrorism Working Group Meeting 
June Jun-10 
The United States and Russia agree to a Memorandum of 
Understanding on aviation security. 
July  
  August 
  September 
  October  
  November Nov-10 
NRC leaders discuss the continued importance of cooperation 
in the fight against terrorism at the Lisbon Summit. 
December  
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2011 
 
January  25-Jan-11 
Obama condemns the suicide bombing at Moscow's 
Domodedovo airport. 
February  
  March Mar-11 
The FBI receives information from the FSB alleging that 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaev are jihadists.  
April Apr-11 The NRC approves an Updated Action Plan on terrorism. 
May 26-May-11 
U.S. Secretary of State designates Caucasus Emirate as a 
terrorist group under Executive Order 13224. 
26-May-11 Obama and Putin give a joint statement on counterterrorism. 
 26-May-11 
The U.S. State Department offers $5 million as a reward for 
Doku Umarov. 
June Jun-11 NATO and Russia conduct the exercise Vigilant Skies. 
July  
  August Aug-11 
The United States and Russia complete the Vigilant Eagle 
exercise. 
September Sep-11 
The FSB provides the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with 
information on Tamerlan Tsarnaev. 
Sep-11 
The United States and Russia work to launch the Global 
Counterterrorism Forum at the UN General Assembly. 
October  Oct-11 
The U.S. and Russian navies successfully complete the 
Pacific Eagle exercise. 
November Nov-11 
The director of the U.S. Terrorist Screening Center visits 
Moscow. 
December 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




  February  22-Feb-12 
Counterterrorism Working Group chairmen ambassadors hold 
an introductory meeting. 
March Mar-12 
The NRC plans a civil-military counterterrorism tabletop 
exercise. 
   April Apr-12 
The first civilian-military NRC counterterrorism tabletop 
exercise is conducted at NATO Headquarters. 
May May-12 
U.S. Deputy Director of National Intelligence attended a 
Security Council forum in St. Petersburg. 
June 
  July  
  August 
  September 13-Sep-12 
Putin comments on Benghazi attack, saying it will motivate 
join counterterrorism cooperation.  
October  
  November 
  December 





 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




  February  
  March 
  
April 20-Apr-13 
Putin offers condolences after the Boston Marathon 
bombings and emphasizes his interest in increasing 
cooperation. 
29-Apr-13 
Obama and Putin discuss cooperation as a result of the 
Boston Marathon bombings. 
May   
June 
17-Jun-13 
Obama and Putin give a joint statement on counterterrorism 
at Lough Erne. 
Jun-13 
 Obama and Putin establish the Working Group on Threats to 
and in the Use of ICTs in the Context of International 
Security. 
July  
  August 




The Working Group on Threats to and in the Use of ICTs in 
the Context of International Security holds its inaugural 
bilateral meeting. 
22-Nov-13 
The Working Group on Threats to and in the Use of ICTs in 




17-Dec-13 The UN passes resolution 2129. 
30-Dec-13 
NSC Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden issues a statement on the 
attacks in Russia. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Obama and Putin talk on the phone to discuss Sochi security 
cooperation. 
27-Jan-14 The UN passes resolution 2133.  
21-Jan-14 
General Dempsey and General Gerasimov discuss possible 
technology exchanges to ensure security in Sochi.  
February  
  March 
  April 
  May 
  June 23-Jun-14 
Putin and Obama discuss concerns regarding IS in Syria and 
Iraq.  
July  
  August 15-Aug-14 The UN passes resolution 2185. 
September 
  October  14-Oct-14 Kerry and Lavrov discuss cooperation regarding IS.  
November 
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